University of Miami Law School

Institutional Repository
University of Miami Business Law Review

12-1-2016

Turning Cash into Votes: The Law and Economics
of Campaign Contributions
Brett Silverberg

Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umblr
Part of the Election Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Brett Silverberg, Turning Cash into Votes: The Law and Economics of Campaign Contributions, 25 U. Miami Bus. L. Rev. 111 (2016)
Available at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umblr/vol25/iss1/5

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Business
Law Review by an authorized administrator of Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact library@law.miami.edu.

Turning Cash into Votes: The Law and
Economics of Campaign Contributions
Brett Silverberg*
As a result of the recent Citizens United decision and its “Super
PAC” spawn, individuals, corporations, and unions are allowed
to independently spend unlimited amounts to influence elections.
The ramifications of the Citizens United ruling have seemingly
had a grave impact on the 2016 Presidential Election. In addition
to examining the laws—and their loopholes—of political
campaign contributions, this Essay will also explore the
economics of campaign contributions. Ultimately, there are two
reasons as to why corporations provide such large sums of money:
one is rent creation, which is the attempt to gain political favors
for “special interests;” the second is rent extraction, which is an
attempt to avoid political disfavors. As the behavior of candidates
continues to resemble the practices of bribery and extortion,
campaign finance reform efforts are likely to become more
aggressive—in an effort to curb corruption, or the appearance of
corruption. Moreover, in the wake of Justice Scalia’s death, the
Court may consider revisiting and overturning Citizens United.
As such, this Essay will investigate potential solutions to combat
the lax campaign finance laws.

*
J.D./M.B.A. Candidate 2018, University of Miami School of Law; B.A., 2013,
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I. INTRODUCTION
[Lobbyists] are not people who are [giving money]
because they like the color of [Jeb Bush’s] hair . . .
[Lobbyists] are highly sophisticated killers. And when
they give five million dollars, or two million, or a million
to Jeb, they have him just like a puppet. He’ll do whatever
they want. He is their puppet.1
In the wake of the Court’s decision in Citizens United v. FEC,2 the
floodgates have opened for unlimited amounts of money to be funneled
into political campaigns.3 As such, there is a growing sentiment that the
political candidate who raises the most money is at a competitive
advantage over the field of candidates with respect to winning an election.4
1

Philip Bump, Donald Trump Says He’d Be ‘Obligated’ to Big Donors. But He’s
Raising Money from Them., THE WASH. POST: THE FIX (Aug. 25, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2015/08/25/donald-trump-says-polsare-beholden-to-big-donors-so-why-is-he-raising-super-pac-funds/ (quoting Donald
Trump).
2
See generally Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S.Ct. 876 (2010).
3
See Beth Rowen, Super PACs Explained, INFOPLEASE, http://www.infoplease.com/us/
government/super-pacs.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2016).
4
See Wesley Lowery, 91% of the Time the Better-Financed Candidate Wins. Don’t Act
Surprised., THE WASH. POST: THE FIX (Apr. 4, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ne
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The 2008 Presidential Election reinforced the truism that money wins
elections, as President Obama amassed a nearly two-to-one monetary
advantage over Senator John McCain.5 Indeed, conventional wisdom is
that money wins elections because money allows candidates to spend on
advertising, which ultimately translates to votes.6
Campaign spending, however, has not always been as influential in
elections as conventional wisdom holds. In the pre-Citizens United era,
candidates had to adhere to more stringent campaign finance laws and
accept limited contributions from donors.7 From 1976 to the early 2000s,
most presidential candidates relied on the public funding program to
subsidize their campaigns.8 Through the imposition of strict spending
limits, the presidential public funding program reduced the fundraising
frenzy that now surrounds presidential races, enabling candidates without
access to large sums of money to still run viable campaigns.9 As a result
of Citizens Untied and the proliferation of Super PACs, however,
presidential candidates have instead chosen to fund their campaigns with
private contributions to avoid being subjected to the strict spending limits
imposed by the presidential public funding program.10
Now six years removed from the Citizens United decision and in the
midst of the 2016 Presidential Race, “[b]ehind-the-scenes jockeying to
raise big bucks from bundlers connected to super-PACs and third-party
groups is well underway.”11 The cost of campaigning has risen to new
heights, as fundraising experts have predicted that the total cost of the 2016
Presidential Campaign will reach $5 billion—almost double the cost of the
ws/the-fix/wp/2014/04/04/think-money-doesnt-matter-in-elections-this-chart-says-yourewrong/.
5
Jeb Bush’s 2016 presidential campaign, however, casts doubt on this truism. See
Ashley Killough, Jeb Bush’s Doomed Campaign, CNN POLITICS, http://www.cnn.com
/2016/02/21/politics/jeb-bushs-doomed-campaign/ (last updated Feb. 22, 2016, 11:56
AM).
6
See Philip Bump, Does More Campaign Money Actually Buy More Votes: An
Investigation, THE WIRE (Nov. 11, 2013, 3:45 PM), http://www.thewire.com/politics/2013
/11/does-more-campaign-money-actually-buy-more-votes-investigation/71473/
(portraying the correlation between spending differential and voter differential).
7
See Aliyah Frumin, Money Has Too Much of an Influence in Politics, Americans Say,
MSNBC, http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/money-has-too-much-influence-politics-say-am
ericans (last updated June 2, 2015, 9:12 PM).
8
See The Presidential Public Funding Program, FEC (Apr. 1993),
http://www.fec.gov/info/pfund.htm.
9
Id.
10
See Tarini Parti, Will 2012 Be the End of the Presidential Public Financing System?,
OPENSECRETS.ORG (Aug. 5, 2011), http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2011/08/the-end-ofpresidential-public-financing/.
11
Amie Parnes & Kevin Cirilli, The $5 Billion Presidential Campaign?, THE HILL (Jan.
21, 2015, 4:54 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/ballot-box/presidential-races/230318-the-5-bi
llion-campaign.
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2012 Presidential Campaign.12 Unsurprisingly, spending by outside
groups has ballooned during the three federal election cycles following
Citizens United.13 Given that candidates now have to compete with the
messages and money spent by Super PACs, political appetites for
campaign contributions are even more voracious. Using President
Obama’s 2012 re-election campaign as a benchmark, candidates must
raise $1.1 billion to meet the cost of a winning presidential campaign.14
Acknowledging the trend in the deregulation of campaign finance, former
Senator Robert Byrd states, “[t]he incessant money chase that currently
permeates every crevice of our political system is like an unending circular
marathon . . . .And it is a race that sends a clear message to people that it
is money, money, money—not ideas, not principles, but money—that
reigns supreme in American politics.”15
This begs the following question: are the current campaign
contribution limits enough to prevent corporations from having a
corrupting influence—through independent expenditures—on federal
officeholders? Indeed, as big money continues to flow through the political
process, the appearance of corruption has become a growing concern given
that it both suggests a high likelihood of actual corruption, and results in
the erosion of public trust in the government.16 Implicit in this notion is
that politicians are neglecting the common good in favor of special interest
groups. At the first 2016 Democratic presidential debate, Senator Bernie
Sanders vehemently asserted that as a result of Citizens United, “our
campaign finance system is corrupt and is undermining American
democracy. Millionaires and billionaires are pouring unbelievable sums of
money into the political process in order to fund super PACs and to elect
candidates who represent their interests, not the interests of the working
people.”17 The overarching point of Senator Sanders’ argument is that
12

Id.
Outside groups spent over $330 million in the presidential campaign preceding
Citizens United. In contrast, in the first presidential election following Citizens United,
outside groups spent over $600 million and collected over $800 million in contributions.
See Albert W. Alschuler, Limiting Political Contributions after Mccutcheon, Citizens
United, and SpeechNow 26-28 (Univ. of Chi. Law Sch.: Pub. Law and Legal Theory
Working Papers, Paper No. 485, 2014), http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcont
ent.cgi?article=1945&context=public_law_and_legal_theory.
14
See Parti, supra note 10.
15
Major Garrett, Money, Politics, and the First Amendment (Cato Inst. Briefing Papers,
Paper No. 30, 1997), http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/bp030.pdf.
16
ROBERT C. POST, CITIZENS DIVIDED: CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM AND THE
CONSTITUTION 55 (2014).
17
Full Transcript: Democratic Presidential Debate, THE NEW YORK TIMES (Oct. 14,
2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/14/us/politics/democratic-debate-transcript.html
?_r=0.
13
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because of Citizens United, Wall Street now regulates Congress—as
opposed to vice versa.18 Nonetheless, given the recent passing of Justice
Scalia, who was part of the 5-4 majority that ruled in favor of striking
down the ban on corporate independent expenditures, there is a greater
likelihood that the Court will choose to revisit, and perhaps overrule,
Citizens United.19

II. PAY TO PLAY: THE ECONOMICS BEHIND CAMPAIGN
CONTRIBUTIONS
Imagine a scene out of the television drama House of Cards, where
political candidates spend the majority of their time courting millionaires
and billionaires behind closed doors—instead of allocating the time to
meet with constituents—in an effort to solicit campaign contributions.20
Indeed, these types of encounters between candidates and wealthy
individuals seem to be commonplace, especially at the beginning of
election cycles.21 But, what exactly is being discussed—or better yet,
exchanged—behind these closed doors?
Contrary to conventional wisdom, money does not actually buy
elections.22 Money does, however, buy politicians—even if the politicians
do not intend to be bought.23 The public perception is that elective offices
are sold to the highest bidder, and campaign contributions are the
18

Id.
This notion will be further explored in Section V.
20
See Jonathan Soros, Soros: Big Money Can’t Buy Elections – Influence is Something
Else, REUTERS: THE GREAT DEBATE (Feb. 10, 2015), http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate
/2015/02/09/soros-there-is-no-idyllic-pre-citizens-united-era-to-return-to/ (“The quest for
campaign cash suffuses political life. Candidates in competitive elections can spend more
than 60 percent of their time raising money.”).
21
See DAVID MAGLEBY & CANDICE J. NELSON, THE MONEY CHASE: CONGRESSIONAL
CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM 66 (1990) (“Early money is generally considered especially
important, not only because it helps pay for necessary polling and research, staff,
organizing and planning, and developing a media strategy, but because it works to establish
credibility, which in turn helps to secure funding for the latter stages of the campaign.”).
22
See Bump, supra note 1; see also Stephen J. Dubner, How Much Does Campaign
Spending Influence the Election? A Freakonomics Quorum, FREAKONOMICS (Jan. 17, 2012,
9:40 AM), http://freakonomics.com/2012/01/17/how-much-does-campaign-spendinginfluence-the-election-a-freakonomics-quorum/ (illustrating that candidate spending has
diminishing marginal returns and is an inadequate predictor of success).
23
“A wealthy individual or entity could threaten to bankroll a large Super PAC working
against an elected official up for reelection in the event that official acts inconsistently with
the wealthy individual or entity’s interests. Even without an explicit threat or quid pro quo,
an elected official could be influenced out of fear that the wealthy individuals or entities
will bankroll her opposition.” Richard L. Hasen, Super PAC Contributions, Corruption,
and the Proxy War Over Coordination, 9 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 9 (2014)
(footnote omitted).
19
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functional equivalent of bribes.24 Correspondingly, many experts have
theorized that big check donors are driven by business and ego, and they
contribute to ideologically like-minded candidates who are beholden to
lobbyists, donors, and special interests.25 But, what exactly are these big
check donors paying for? The myopic view is that private interest
contributions purport to buy access and influence, which can be leveraged
for political favors.26 Although this view is not incorrect, it is only partially
the answer.27 The other part of the answer—which is frequently
overlooked—is that contributions “to politicians often are made not for
particular political favors, but to avoid particular political disfavor.”28
Economists have arrived at the realization “that, as a strictly positive
matter, government regulation ha[s] the power to create benefits that [are]
unavailable other than through politics, or [are] more cheaply available
through politics.”29 These benefits are referred to as “rents,” a term that
“economists apply to any return obtained by virtue of controlling a scarce
or unique factor of production.”30 Together, the rent creation and rent
extraction economic models of regulatory activity, which are both based
on payments to politicians in exchange for services, explain why private
interests are paying, and what they are paying for.31 In a nutshell, both
concepts are driven by political self-interest, where politicians—the
“suppliers” of such rents—seek to maximize their total returns “by
equating at the margin the returns from votes, contributions, bribes, power,
and other sources of personal gain. All these, in turn, are positive functions
not only of private benefits [politicians] confer[,] but also of private costs
[they] agre[e] not to impose.”32 While the two models of regulatory
activity need not be mutually exclusive, “a combined strategy of rent
creation and rent extraction is not necessarily optimal to politicians.”33

24

See Jeffrey Milyo, Campaign Finance, in THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICS
52 (David R. Henderson ed., 2d ed. 2007).
25
See Transcript of CNN Newsroom from 10:00 – 11:00 AM ET, CNN (Dec. 26, 2015),
http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/1512/26/cnr.02.html.
26
FRED S. MCCHESNEY, MONEY FOR NOTHING: POLITICIANS, RENT EXTRACTION, AND
POLITICIAN EXTORTION 2 (1997).
27
See id.
28
Id.
29
Id. at 9-10.
30
Richard A. Posner, Natural Monopoly and Its Regulation, 21 STAN. L. REV. 548, 562
(1969).
31
See MCCHESNEY, supra note 26, at 2, 53.
32
Fred S. McChesney, Rent Extraction and Rent Creation in the Economic Theory of
Regulation, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 101, 105 (1987).
33
Id. at 110.
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A. Legalized Bribery: The Concept of Rent Creation
Rent creation is the orthodox economic theory of regulation.34 When
rent seeking is extended to rent creation, there are three seeming
propositions that follow: (1) you have to “pay to play,” as politicians will
not provide something for nothing; (2) parties who contribute to politicians
are purchasing special treatment, which comes at the expense of those who
are not paying enough; and (3) by examining the extent to which parties
“pay to play,” one can identify the parties receiving special treatment.35
In short, the rent creation economic model can be explained in the
following manner: “[i]f expected political rents net of the costs of
organizing and procuring favorable regulation are positive, then producers
will demand—pay for—regulation. If payments sufficient to compensate
politicians for the costs of creating regulation are forthcoming, they will
supply it.”36 This model takes into account that there is a market for
regulation as there is for any other economic good; the market, however,
is an auction market, “where various groups of potential winners and
losers vie for the amounts and kinds of rent creation that government can
supply.”37 The rent creation model further posits the rule that regulation is
acquired by the donor and is designed and operated primarily for the
donor’s benefit.38 The more inelastic industry demand is for the regulation,
the greater the relative attraction of political rent creation.39 Accordingly,
“if industry supply is perfectly elastic, there is no producers’ surplus and
so no opportunity for rent extraction. On the other hand, when industry
demand is perfectly elastic, extraction of private rents is the only plausible
political strategy.”40
Indeed, the rent creation model presupposes that there is an exchange
between the politician and the donor.41 As such, the two contracting parties
discuss what benefits the politician can provide the donor, and what the
costs are of obtaining those benefits.42 In such an exchange, the politician
demands either votes or money, and in return offers a monopoly profit as
consideration.43 Although this arrangement appears to be a win-win for
34

Id. at 104.
See “Pay to Play” Politics Examined, With Lessons for Campaign-Finance Reform,
FPO (Jan. 1. 2002), http://www.freepatentsonline.com/article/Independent-Review/84017
560.html
36
MCCHESNEY, supra note 26, at 9.
37
MCCHESNEY, supra note 26, at 16.
38
MCCHESNEY, supra note 26, at 9.
39
MCCHESNEY, supra note 26, at 35.
40
Id.
41
MCCHESNEY, supra note 26, at 9.
42
Id.
43
See McChesney, supra note 32, at 104.
35
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both sides, competition for the monopoly profit “produces additional
social loss from rent-seeking.”44 From a welfare economics standpoint,
society bears the burden of the excessive regulation costs—especially
when opportunity costs are considered—that flow from the demonstrated
opportunistic behavior by politicians and their consumers.45
Applying the rent creation model to the context of campaign
contributions, donors are paying for access and influence, which they
leverage for regulations favorable to their particular interests. Rentseeking efforts by big check donors can range from lobbying for public
subsidies in order to be given wealth that has already been created, to
imposing regulations on competitors, thereby enabling the donor to
command a greater market share.46 By virtue of giving large campaign
contributions to induce political action, private interests groups are
essentially bribing candidates in an effort to capture the rents.47 Absent
explicit quid pro quo agreements, campaign contributions can still
effectively function as “implicit bribes.”48 Presumably, the larger the
contribution given to the candidate, the likelier it becomes that the
candidate will exercise his or her discretionary power to create and allocate
rents to benefit the donor, provided that the candidate takes office.49 Given
that there is no guarantee a candidate will win an election, however, donors
could potentially see no return on their investments; but such a risk is a
necessary undertaking if the donors desire to “pay to play” the rent-seeking
game and reap the potential rewards.50
44

Id.
“The complete cost of all rent seeking activities is the summation of resources
exhausted in seeking rents plus the consumer surplus that could be created if rent seeking
resources were switched to productive endeavors.” See Tyler Cowen & Alexander
Tabarrok, The Opportunity Costs of Rent Seeking, ALEX TABARROCK, https://mason.gmu.
edu/~atabarro/TheOpportunityCostsofRentSeeking.pdf (last visited Jan. 28, 2016).
46
See MCCHESNEY, supra note 26, at 14-15 (depicting the economics behind the
“raising-rivals’-cost model”).
47
See MCCHESNEY, supra note 26, at 22.
48
See generally Brian F. Jordan, Disclosing Bribes in Disguise: Campaign
Contributions as Implicit Bribery and Enforcing Violations Impartially, 17 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 1435 (2015).
49
See Hasen, supra note 23, at 4 (“Some supporters of [contribution] limits worry not
just about outright bribery, but also that, thanks to human nature and feelings of reciprocity,
candidates who receive extremely large contributions will feel grateful to large donors and
will take legislative and other steps to favor the donors.”); see also Garrick B. Pursley, The
Campaign Finance Safeguards of Federalism, 63 EMORY L.J. 781, 820-22 (2014) (“As
independent expenditures have become functionally equivalent to direct contributions, we
should expect them to generate influence for donors proportional to their amounts.”).
50
See, e.g., Emily Flitter, Why U.S. Billionaires May Not Be Able to Buy the 2016
Election, REUTERS (June 2, 2016, 10:06 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usaelection-billionaires-idUSKBN0OI07120150602 (stating billionaire Sheldon Adelson
contributed more than $100 million in 2012 to unsuccessful political campaigns).
45
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From the public’s perspective, it is the economic model of rent
creation that engenders concerns over the looming presence of big money
in campaigns, as special interest groups continue to come away as the
winners of the “pay to play” rent-seeking game.51 Concerns over the
implicit relationships forged between candidates and campaign
contributors coincide with the notion that the selling of access gives rise
to the appearance of corruption.52 The Court has held, however, that
spending money to “garner influence over or access to” elected officials
does not create quid pro quo corruption.53 While it is seemingly
conceivable that rent creation can be treated as a source of corruption in
the form of usurpation of public power for private gains, the Court remains
unwilling to impose sanctions for implicit agreements involving campaign
contributions—effectually incentivizing the formation of rent-creation
contracts.54 Nevertheless, as the law continues to allow agreements
involving money in exchange for political favors, rent-creation contracts
will continue to arouse public revulsion.55 Given that such agreements are
legal, however, Congress would have to enact legislation if it intends to
deter the formation of rent-creation contracts.

B. Political Extortion: The Concept of Rent Extraction
As Professor Fred McChesney explains in Money For Nothing:
Politicians, Rent Extraction, and Political Extortion, the rent creation
model cannot stand alone, as it is part of a larger economic theory of
regulation based upon rent extraction—a theory that has seldom been
considered.56 Moreover, among the inherent flaws in the rent creation
model is the following: the model treats politicians as rational individuals
who seek to maximize their own personal welfare, and in so doing, fails to
give credence to the view that politicians attempt to maximize utility.57 In
51

See McChesney, supra note 35, at 348, 351.
See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 297-98 (2003) (Kennedy, J., concurring in
judgment in part and dissenting in part).
53
McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S.Ct. 1434, 1450-51; 1462 (2014) (quoting Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26 (1976)).
54
See Brian F. Jordan, supra note 48, at passim. This issue will be further discussed in
Section IV.
55
See MCCHESNEY, supra note 26, at 54 (“[T]he popular revulsion against paying
politicians presupposes that payments are made for special favors, since the calls for reform
constantly focus on limiting what individuals can give—not the total of what politicians
can take.”).
56
See McChesney, supra note 32, at 102; see also Douglas Ginsburg, A New Economic
Theory of Regulation: Rent Extraction Rather Than Rent Creation, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1771,
1773 (1999) (reviewing FRED S. MCCHESNEY, MONEY FOR NOTHING: POLITICIANS, RENT
EXTRACTION, AND POLITICIAN EXTORTION (1997)).
57
MCCHESNEY, supra note 26, at 17.
52

120

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25:111

this sense, the rent creation model implicitly treats politicians as passive
brokers, who wait for rent seekers to approach them to begin a rentcreation auction, and redistribute wealth in response to competing private
demands.58 Such a misconception, however, ignores the fact that
politicians “actively see[k] votes, campaign contributions, and other forms
of recompense, contracting to receive a supply of goods or services from
private parties in response to [the politicians’] demands.”59 Furthermore,
the rent creation model is also deficient in two other related aspects: (1) it
does not examine ways other than rent creation that a politician can obtain
benefits from private parties, and (2) it fails to consider how politicians are
able to gain not by creating rents for some, but rather by causing losses to
others.60
Contrary to popular belief, a politician has alternative ways to engage
private parties in exchange.61 Depending on market conditions, a politician
may demand votes or money in exchange for a monopoly profit, as in the
rent creation economic model; however, “a politician may also make his
demands on private parties, not by promising benefits, but by threatening
to impose costs—a form of political extortion.”62 The latter strategy, which
essentially amounts to political blackmail, epitomizes the economic model
of rent extraction.63 As long as the expected cost of the “act threatened
exceeds the value of the consideration that the private parties must give up
to avoid legislative action,” rational private parties will be just as willing
to surrender the tribute demanded of them to avoid the imposition of costs
as they would be to pay legislators to have rents created, provided that
marginal utility of wealth is constant.64 Indeed, bribery and extortion are
the two forms of interactions observed in the world that enable politicians
to elicit large contributions—aside from contributions tied to altruistic
motives.65 Unlike the model of rent creation, however, the model of rent
extraction is able to answer the overarching question: “[h]ow does a
politician gain from imposing net losses?”66
The basic notion of rent extraction is ultimately quite simple. Given
that political office confers a property right not just to create rents, but also
to impose costs that would destroy private rents, politicians can legally

58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66

MCCHESNEY, supra note 26, at 18.
MCCHESNEY, supra note 26, at 17.
MCCHESNEY, supra note 26, at 18-19.
MCCHESNEY, supra note 26, at 21-22.
Id.
See MCCHESNEY, supra note 26, at 22-23.
MCCHESNEY, supra note 26, at 22.
See MCCHESNEY, supra note 26, at 21-23.
See MCCHESNEY, supra note 26, at 19.
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extract wealth from private parties.67 Unlike the rent creation model, the
rent extraction model focuses primarily on politicians, and views them as
independent actors making their own demands on private parties.68 In
short, by first threatening to exercise their rights to impose burdensome
restrictions on private actors “and then by forbearing from the
expropriation of private rents already in existence,” politicians stand to
gain by means of extortion payments.69 In this sense, “rent extraction—
receiving payments not to take or destroy private wealth—is ‘money for
nothing.’”70 As opposed to politically created rents, the private rents
described in this economic model “represent returns to their owners’
entrepreneurial ability and firm-specific private investments.”71 Unlike the
payments made in the rent creation model, the payments made in the rent
extraction model are aimed at protecting existing rents.72 Indeed, a
politician threatening to expropriate private wealth is paid to allow
consumers to continue earning returns on capital they have already
invested for themselves.73 Because “[t]he passage of sharply focused taxes
and regulations will reduce the returns that private capital owners receive
from their skills and investments[,]” private owners are incentivized to
strike bargains with politicians in order to protect their returns, provided
that “the side payments to politicians are lower than the expected losses
from compliance with the threatened law.”74 This begs the question: after
identifying private capital stocks whose returns will come out of
producers’ surplus, how can a politician extract a share of that surplus?75
There are ultimately two different methods of extracting private rents
that politicians have at their disposal. Seemingly, the more prominent and
preferred strategy of the two is to first threaten, and then forbear from
expropriating private rents already created, as previously discussed. The
strategy of cost forbearance, however, can assume several forms.76
Perhaps the most blatant form is the threat of price controls aiming to
deregulate a previously cartelized industry.77 For example, the threat of
implementing a price ceiling, which mandates prices below the level of
the prevailing market price, could induce the targeted firms to pay for

67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77

See MCCHESNEY, supra note 26, at 41.
See MCCHESNEY, supra note 26, at 19.
See id.
See MCCHESNEY, supra note 26, at 3.
McChesney, supra note 32, at 102.
See MCCHESNEY, supra note 26, at 35.
See MCCHESNEY, supra note 26, at.26.
McChesney, supra note 32, at 102.
MCCHESNEY, supra note 26, at 26.
MCCHESNEY, supra note 26, at 23.
MCCHESNEY, supra note 26, at 26-27.
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regulatory forbearance.78 In such a scenario, it behooves the firms to pay
in order to prevent potential dilution of their market shares. Additionally,
instead of threatening to institute an industry-wide price reduction,
politicians can threaten to increase costs.79 Regulations that threaten to
impose additional costs on private firms could include any of the following
measures: enacting excise taxes; placing costly reporting requirements on
financial service firms; and mandating benefit payments on insurance
firms.80 Any one of these examples would presumably “elicit offers of
payment from affected producers in exchange for [the politician]
withdrawing the proposed [legislation].”81 Political opportunities for rent
extraction abound because valuable specific capital is an inevitable byproduct of a firm’s financial activities.82 Nevertheless, rent extraction in
any context “can succeed only to the extent that threats to expropriate
private rents are credible.”83
Alternatively, politicians are able to extract rents not just by
threatening to impose costs and subsequently forbearing, but also by
actually enacting regulation to create a demand for them to mitigate the
costs.84 On the one hand, “politicians can always legislate now and sell
repeal later.”85 On the other hand, to make credible and convincing threats
to reduce others’ capital, it may be necessary at times for politicians to
intervene and enact legislation to extract private rents from those who fail
to pay.86 In this regard, the use of specialized agencies to impose costs
could help the politician generate greater credibility.87 In addition to
providing politicians with market insights, the bureaucrats can take
responsibility for threatened government intervention; despite working on
behalf of the politician, the bureaucrats will be perceived by some voters
as independent actors.88 In a sense, this illusion masks the politician’s
opportunistic behavior. As such, the bureaucrats can impose costs on
private parties, and in so doing they create opportunities for politicians to
extract concessions from affected consumers looking to buy legislative
repeal.89
78

Id.
See MCCHESNEY, supra note 26, at 29.
80
McChesney, supra note 32, at 116.
81
MCCHESNEY, supra note 26, at 26-27.
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See MCCHESNEY, supra note 26, at 41.
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McChesney, supra note 32, at 109.
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See MCCHESNEY, supra note 26, at 37.
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MCCHESNEY, supra note 26, at 39.
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See MCCHESNEY, supra note 26, at 39.
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See id.
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See MCCHESNEY, supra note 26, at 37.
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One such example of this arrangement is the FTC’s “Used Car Rule,” where the FTC
promulgated a rule—at Congress’ request—to impose costly auto-defect disclosure
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2016-2017]

TURNING CASH INTO VOTES

123

Applying the rent extraction model to the context of campaign
contributions, it seems that the attitudes of candidates are more in keeping
with the rent extraction model as opposed to the rent creation model. In
other words, it would be preposterous to think that candidates are passive
players in the rent-seeking game—a presupposition of the rent creation
model.90 Candidates’ attitudes unequivocally reflect an active need to raise
money and seek out campaign contributors.91 Moreover, viewed through
the lens of rent extraction, candidates would seek out contributions in
return for future regulatory inaction, provided that they take office.
Candidates are incentivized to uphold their promises because if they fail
to do so, their campaign contributors will take their money and vote
elsewhere in the next election cycle. Assuming a non-incumbent candidate
wins an election and takes office, however, any contributions given to the
newly elected official to honor the contracts previously negotiated would
yield no rents.92 Rather, such contributions would protect against
unforeseen costs that the newly elected official could otherwise impose.93
Given that rent creation is to rent extraction as bribery is to extortion,
the rent creation game is certainly more desirable from the perspective of
producers.94 Needless to say, the rent extraction game is not one that is
conducive to buying special treatment in the political marketplace. Private
parties instead are compelled to pay to avoid wealth expropriation.
Although the politician personally benefits from either creating or
extracting private rents, the two strategies have strikingly different
implications for private actors. “Of course, producers themselves would
rather buy new rents than pay to protect their own existing rents.”95 In
some markets, however, opportunities for rent creation may be slight
compared to the opportunities for rent extraction.96 Nevertheless, it is the
politician who has the power to decide what game will be played: rent
creation or rent extraction.

requirements. “On promulgation of the rule, used-car dealers and their trade association
descended on Congress, spending large sums of money for relief from the proposed rule’s
costs. When the concessions were forthcoming, Congress vetoed the very rule it had
ordered.” McChesney, supra note 32, at 114.
90
See MCCHESNEY, supra note 26, at 17-18.
91
See MCCHESNEY, supra note 26, at 47.
92
See MCCHESNEY, supra note 26, at 23.
93
See id.
94
See MCCHESNEY, supra note 26, at 31.
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MCCHESNEY, supra note 26, at 35.
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See MCCHESNEY, supra note 26, at 36.
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III. CURRENT CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTION LAWS: THE
BACK DOOR IS OPEN
The intended purpose of campaign finance laws is to protect American
democracy from corruption, and preserve the integrity of elections.97 Yet,
current campaign finance laws are a farce: they have the deceiving
appearance of imposing strict limits, but in reality the laws are littered with
loopholes and the limits are easily circumvented.98 At the heart of the
campaign finance “loophole” is the distinction drawn between campaign
contributions and campaign expenditures.99
Dating back to 1976, Buckley v. Valeo’s contribution-expenditure
distinction has been the touchstone of the campaign finance framework.100
In Buckley, the Court held that the First Amendment protects both political
contributions and political expenditures.101 Moreover, the Court
invalidated several sections of the 1971 Federal Election Campaign Act
(FECA), as amended in 1974, that placed limits on campaign contributions
to candidates, campaign expenditures, and on expenditures by individuals
or organizations so long as the expenditures were not coordinated with any
political candidates.102 Although the Court in Buckley upheld the
contribution limits to prevent quid pro quo corruption, or its appearance,
the Court struck down the limits placed on independent expenditures
because such limits did not implicate the government’s interest in
preventing corruption.103 The Buckley decision, however, led to the

97

See Jeffrey H. Birnbaum, For Campaign Contributions by the Wheelbarrow, the Back
Door Is Open, WASH. POST (May 20, 2008), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/con
tent/article/2008/05/19/AR2008051902172.html (quoting Taylor Lincoln) (“Campaign
finance limits are supposed to prevent the undue influence of big contributors.”).
98
See McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S.Ct. 1434, 1466 (2014) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (The
majority’s opinion “creates a loophole that will allow a single individual to contribute
millions of dollars to a political party or to a candidate’s campaign.”).
99
See Todd Paulson & David Schultz, Bucking Buckley: Voter Attitudes, Tobacco
Money, and Campaign Contribution Corruption in Minnesota Politics, 19 HAMLINE J. PUB.
L. & POL’Y 449, 453 (1998) (Due to a lack of restrictions upon expenditures, wealthy
individuals would be able to subvert contribution limits, rendering the latter meaningless).
100
J. Robert Abraham, Saving Buckley: Creating A Stable Campaign Finance
Framework, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1078, 1078 (2010).
101
See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976).
102
Paulson & Schultz, supra note 99, at 449-50.
103
See Paulson, supra note 99, at 449-50.; see also Jordan May, “Are We Corrupt
Enough Yet?” The Ambiguous Quid Pro Quo Corruption Requirement in Campaign
Finance Restrictions, 54 WASHBURN L.J. 357, 370-71 (2015) (“Buckley distinguished
campaign contributions from expenditures because expenditures lacked prearrangement
and coordination that could give rise to a quid pro quo arrangement.”).
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unforeseen “soft money” loophole that enabled parties and candidates to
circumvent the FECA’s contribution limits.104
While the 2002 Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) closed the
“soft money” loophole, the influence of “soft money” on elections has
since been displaced by the influence of Super PACs and independent
expenditures on elections in the post-Citizens United era.105 Indeed, the
Citizens United ruling changed campaign finance law, shifting campaign
finance jurisprudence in a deregulatory direction.106 The decision
reaffirmed the limits placed on contributions; however, the Court
overturned its own precedent by holding that regulations prohibiting nonparty organizations (such as for-profit corporations and unions) from
making independent expenditures for electioneering communications are
unconstitutional abridgements of the First Amendment right to free
speech.107 Consequently, the longstanding ban on direct corporate
spending on campaigns has been lifted, and corporations are now free to
spend as much as they want to generate influence and help elect or defeat
candidates.108 Given the unregulated nature of outside spending, the
question that now arises in the aftermath of Citizens United is whether
large independent expenditures generate more influence on campaigns
than direct campaign contributions?
As it currently stands, the Federal Election Commission (FEC)
contribution limits allow individuals to donate a maximum of $5,400
directly to candidates—$2,700 for the primary and $2,700 for the general
election—and up to $33,400 per year to a national party committee’s
general fund.109 In addition, individuals can donate $5,000 per year to a

104

See Jeffrey P. Geiger, Preparing for 2006: A Constitutional Argument for Closing the
527 Soft Money Loophole, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 309, 319 (2005) (Political party
activities, such as “sham issue advocacy,” were exempt from hard money limits, and by
carving out such activities from the hard money limits, political parties created a “soft
money” loophole that allowed the parties to generate large “soft money” contributions from
individuals).
105
See Pursley, supra note 49, at 815 (After the BCRA’s ban on parties’ use of soft
money was upheld in McConnell v. FEC, many “soft money” donors shifted their
contributions from the parties to outside groups unaffiliated with the parties.).
106
See May, supra note 103, at 369 (Citizens United rejected the Rehnquist line of cases
because they were inconsistent with the Court’s original intention in Buckley.); see also
SpeechNow.org v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 599 F.3d 686 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (following the
precedent established by Citizens United and holding that limits on contributions to groups
that make independent expenditures are unconstitutional).
107
See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S.Ct. 876, 877 (2010).
108
See The Court’s Blow to Democracy, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 21, 2010), http://www.nytimes
.com/2010/01/22/opinion/22fri1.html?_r=1&scp=31&sq=citizens%20united&st=cse.
109
See FED. ELECTION COMM’N, CITIZENS GUIDE (2004), http://www.fec.gov/pages/broc
hures/citizens.shtml.
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Political Action Committee (“PAC”).110 On the other hand, individuals,
corporations, and unions can contribute unlimited sums of money to Super
PACs; unlike PACs, Super PACs are not subject to contribution limits
because they cannot contribute directly to candidates.111 Accordingly,
Super PACs are subject to two other limitations: (1) they cannot coordinate
directly with candidates,112 and (2) they must report their expenditures and
contributors to the FEC.113 Despite these restrictions, there are loopholes
in both the coordination and disclosure laws. As such, the coordination
and disclosure laws have inadvertently created backdoor funding
channels—effectually rendering the current contribution limits
meaningless.114

IV. THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE CURRENT CAMPAIGN
CONTRIBUTION LAWS
A. Joint Fundraising: Do Candidates and Super PACs Actually
Operate at Arm’s Length?
In addition to the First Amendment, the Court’s basis for nullifying
independent expenditure limits—allowing Super PACs to roam free—is
predicated on the notion that private interest groups operate independently
of the candidates they support.115 Because Super PACs are “independent,”
the government has no anti-corruption interest in limiting their
spending.116 This notion, however, is misguided and warrants
reconsideration, given the rapid emergence of single-candidate Super
110

Id.
See McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S.Ct. 1434 (2014) (discussing distinction between
PACs and Super PACs).
112
See 52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(7)(B) (2012) (Any Super PAC expenditure that is
coordinated with a candidate is treated as a “contribution” to that candidate rather than as
a legally allowed “expenditure.”).
113
See Center for Competitive Politics, Super PACs, http://www.campaignfreedom.org/
external-relations/super-pacs/ (last visited February 2, 2016).
114
This notion will be further explored in the next section. See, e.g., Katla McGlynn, Jon
Stewart, Stephen Colbert Expose More Super PAC Loopholes Without ‘Coordinating,’
HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 23, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/01/18/jon-stew
art-stephen-colbert-expose-super-pac-loopholes_n_1212670.html [http://perma.cc/AP3KLV7Y] (mocking the current coordination laws for allowing coordination between
candidates and Super PACs).
115
See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S.Ct. 876, 902 (2010) (“[T]he
independent expenditure ceiling . . . fails to serve any substantial governmental interest in
stemming the reality or appearance of corruption in the electoral process [because] [t]he
absence of prearrangement and coordination . . . alleviates the danger that expenditures
will be given as a quid pro quo for improper commitments from the candidate.”).
116
See id.
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PACs.117 Absent restrictions on independent expenditures, coordination
laws118 serve as the only line of defense in preventing outside groups from
making “disguised contributions” to candidates.119 Yet, the real-world
application of this new spending paradigm manifests that the current
coordination laws are far from ideal. Despite the coordination ban,
candidates have grown increasingly dependent and entwined with Super
PACs. Take the following hypothetical:
Suppose a candidate for Congress attends a fundraising
event held by a Super PAC set up specifically to support
(and which in practice only supports) that candidate.
During the event, the candidate offers some brief
welcoming remarks to the guests—most of whom have
already contributed the maximum allowable amount of
[$5400] directly to the candidate for that election. The
candidate asks that each individual attendee make a $5000
contribution—the maximum amount that an individual
would be legally permitted to contribute to a PAC
governed by traditional campaign finance limits—to the
Super PAC, which the candidate says he hopes ‘will be
used for a good cause.’ Two minutes later, the candidate
leaves to attend another event; one of the organizers of the
fundraising event, acting on behalf of the Super PAC, then
asks that each attendee give $100,000 instead of $5000,
to be put to the benefit of the candidate who just left the
room.120
While some may dismiss this arrangement as preposterous, it
nevertheless seems common in the world of campaign finance; such an
arrangement is entirely legal given that it is a “non-coordinated” political
activity.121 As long as candidates and Super PACs are not formally
117

“This basic notion of Super PACs as independent of candidates is becoming
increasingly attenuated with the growth and development of Super PACs, especially a new
form of Super PAC focused on electing a single candidate.” Note, Working Together for
an Independent Expenditure: Candidate Assistance with Super Pac Fundraising, 128
HARV. L. REV. 1478, 1483 (2015).
118
“[C]ourts and commentators refer to the concomitant [coordination] rules as
coordination laws.” Brent Ferguson, Beyond Coordination: Defining Indirect Campaign
Contributions for the Super Pac Era, 42 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 471, 524 (2015) (quoting
McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93 (2003)) (Under the coordination laws,
expenditures are treated as contributions if made “in cooperation, consultation, or concert
with” a candidate). .
119
See 52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(7)(B) (2012); McChesney, supra note 32.
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“coordinating,” they are entitled to establish cordial working relationships.
Given the recent trend of collaborative fundraising, the distinction
between “coordinated” and “non-coordinated” political activities is further
attenuated. In addition to allowing candidates attend Super PAC
fundraisers, the FEC also permits the following: single-candidate Super
PACs can be run by former staffers of the candidate; Super PACs and
candidates can hire the same consultants; and Super PACs can run footage
of candidates in their advertisements.122 Moreover, the FEC allows
candidates and Super PACs to publicize their campaign plans over the
Internet, which ultimately enables them to share strategies with one
another.123 Perhaps the greatest enigma is the FEC’s recent stance on
closed-door meetings between candidates and Super PACs. The FEC
recently issued an advisory opinion that gave permission to candidates to
meet privately with just one other wealthy donor and one Super PAC
representative to discuss fundraising—further eroding the boundaries
between candidates and allied Super PACs.124 Acknowledging the
increased collaboration between candidates and Super PACs, a former
chairman of the FEC concedes, “Super PACs are essentially another bank
account for candidates—one that, because of Citizens United, can accept
unlimited money.”125 Nevertheless, the increased collaboration between
candidates and Super PACs is legal, and thus, Congress must pass a new
law if it intends to hinder such collaboration.
As Super PACs continue to garner more influence, outspend
candidates, and ultimately do the heavy lifting, campaign efforts to
circumvent the coordination laws will continue to be aggressive. Such a
notion is emblematic of Jeb Bush’s 2016 presidential campaign, which
exploited another loophole in the coordination laws. While many
candidates tend to have informal connections with Super PACs, Jeb Bush
has enjoyed an even closer structural relationship with his allied Super
PAC, “Right to Rise.”126 Prior to officially announcing his 2016
122

Pursley, supra note 49, at 817-18.
See Pursley, supra note 49, at 817-18.
124
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presidential bid, Jeb Bush ostensibly worked alongside Right to Rise and
spearheaded the committee’s fundraising efforts, accumulating enough
money to run a competitive campaign.127 By delaying his formal
announcement of candidacy for President, Jeb Bush strategically
circumvented the “hard money” campaign contribution limits imposed on
all presidential candidates.128 Given that the coordination laws apply solely
between Super PACs and a candidate’s official campaign, Bush was
legally permitted to solicit unlimited funds for his allied Super PAC
because he had not yet announced his formal candidacy—even though it
was clear that Bush was vying for the Republican nomination.129 Indeed,
the “candidate” label is what triggers the coordination laws from taking
effect, and by pretending to “test the waters” and contemplate announcing
his candidacy, Bush was able to effectually expose a loophole in the
coordination laws and collude with Right to Rise.130 Accordingly, by
delaying his formal announcement, Bush gave himself more time to
coordinate with Right to Rise and develop a strategy for how it will later
spend money on his behalf.131 Although Bush suspended his 2016
presidential campaign, his fundraising tactics are likely to be mimicked by
future candidates seeking to raise unlimited funds, which would make it
even more difficult to police the coordination laws—and would be
counterintuitive to the Court’s determination that Super PACs operate
independently of candidates.132
As Jeb Bush’s campaign demonstrates, Super PACs are increasingly
functioning as an arm of a candidate’s campaign. Candidates are now
outsourcing ordinary campaign tasks to Super PACs; the outsourcing of
such tasks is legal, and thus, Congress must pass new legislation if it
intends to prevent the delegation of campaign tasks to Super PACs.
Accordingly, Super PACs now control advertising, direct mailing, and
voter registration, all of which are tasks that a candidate’s campaign would
frequently handle.133 Viewed in this light, how are Super PACs
functionally any different from traditional PACs? Indeed, there is a
growing sentiment that single-candidate Super PACs now serve as the
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virtual, but legally far less encumbered, alter egos of candidates.134 This
notion presupposes that committees are “organized to back a specific
candidate or [are] formed at the behest of party leaders.”135 Given that
these alter ego Super PACs continue to function as extensions of
candidates’ campaigns, there is a growing belief that contributions made
to these candidate-specific Super PACs should be treated as “disguised
contributions” to candidates.136 As a result of the FEC’s paralysis, the only
conceivable way to effectively deter coordination between candidates and
their alter ego Super PACs is for Congress to take action.137
Single-candidate Super PACs, or “alter ego” Super PACs, are not the
only type of Super PACs created. Rather, as the 2012 Presidential Election
demonstrated, Super PACs can be divided into two broad categories: (1)
the aforementioned alter ego Super PACs, and (2) shadow party
organizations.138 The latter type of Super PAC essentially supplanted 527
organizations, which were interest groups organized under Section 527 of
the Internal Revenue Code—thus granted tax-exempt status—and were
run by party insiders who broadly served their respective party’s campaign
agenda.139 Like the alter ego Super PACs, shadow party Super PACs can
collect unlimited contributions and engage in independent expenditures.140
Whereas alter ego Super PACS serve a more prominent role in the
primaries, shadow party Super PACs take center stage during the general
election.141 Nevertheless, shadow party Super PACs provide candidates
with another vehicle to circumvent campaign contribution limits. Not only
are shadow party Super PACs tasked with collecting donations outside of
the contribution limits imposed on candidates, but they also engage in
“election activity short of express advocacy, including voter registration,
get-out-the-vote efforts, and issue advocacy in support of their party.”142
Despite the fact that the shadow party Super PACs’ spending on “issue
134
See Michael S. Kang, The Year of the Super Pac, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1902, 1919
(2013).
135
Id. at 1919 (quoting Richard Briffault, Super PACs, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1644, 1675-77
(2012)).
136
Richard Briffault, Coordination Reconsidered, 113 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 88, 98
(2013).
137
One bill recently proposed in Congress “would put teeth into the ban on coordination.”
Under the bill, “a super PAC’s activity would be considered ‘coordinated’ if the group
were founded or managed by a candidate’s former employees or consultants or if it
communicated about campaign matters with a candidate’s relatives.” Tightening up on
super PACs, L.A. TIMES (May 10, 2015, 5:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/edito
rials/la-ed-clinton-20150510-story.html.
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See Kang, supra note 134, at 1919-20.
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advocacy” and voter mobilization directly benefits candidates, the
committees’ fundraising activities continue to be perceived as noncoordinated. Moreover, given that shadow party Super PACS are entities
formally distanced from a candidate, they are “able to attack the
candidate’s opponent without any worries about public blowback and the
Super PACs’ long-term reputation.”143 As such, shadow party Super PACs
“serve as the attack arm of negative advertising for candidates without the
countervailing deterrent of reputational accountability144 that holds back
candidates and parties.”
In addition to the emergence of alter ego and shadow party Super
PACs, Citizens United has also led to the emergence of 501(c) “dark
money” groups.145 Although these politically active nonprofit groups are
distinct from Super PACs, they have provided the means to allow Super
PACs to circumvent the leniently enforced disclosure requirements.
Unlike alter ego and shadow party Super PACs, candidates cannot raise
money on behalf of 501(c) groups.146 Nevertheless, because 501(c) groups
must have a “primary purpose” other than electoral activity, they are
exempt from any FECA restrictions on the donations they receive; thus,
they are not required to disclose their donors to the public.147 Not only can
these 501(c) groups accept unlimited donations and protect their donors’
identities, but also, more profoundly, they may transfer their money to
ideologically affiliated Super PACs to spend—thus avoiding the “primary
purpose” restriction.148 In effect, this enables Super PACs to keep the
names of the donors hidden from the public. By virtue of transferring funds
from 501(c) “dark money” groups to Super PACs, Super PACs easily
circumvent the federal disclosure requirements. This dynamic relationship
between Super PACs and 501(c) groups explains why “less than half of
the independent expenditures by outside groups during the 2010 election
cycle were made with disclosure of the contributors’ identities.”149
Moreover, the collusion between Super PACs and 501(c) groups illustrates
that, in addition to the coordination laws, there is a blatant loophole in the
disclosure rules as well—further reinforcing the notion that the limitations
placed on Super PACs are futile. Suffice it to say, the vast influence that
143
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Super PACs have on campaigns is the by-product of the deficient
coordination and disclosure laws.

B. A State of Flux: Why Have Campaign Finance Offenses Not
Been Enforced?
Despite the Justice Department’s recent prosecution of a Virginia
campaign operative for illegal coordination, there remains a paucity of
cases involving campaign finance violations.150 Meanwhile, Senator
Bernie Sanders came away unscathed after using campaign donations to
pay his wife and daughter over $400,000 as campaign staff members.151
Unsurprisingly, Senator Sanders’ aforementioned expenditures
contravene the laws governing the permitted uses of campaign funds.152
Such expenditures are in fact overt attempts to convert contributions to
personal use—which are direct violations of the law.153 It seems
commonplace nowadays for candidates to allocate campaign funds in an
improper manner analogous to Senator Sanders, and despite such
malfeasance, candidates continue to evade civil and criminal liability.154
Correspondingly, the widespread cooperation between candidates,
Super PACs, and 501(c) groups exemplifies that the parties unhesitatingly
believe that they will avoid sanctions for subverting campaign
contribution limits. Given the FEC’s failure to hold candidates
accountable, candidates seemingly have grown apathetic towards
complying with contribution laws. Former Arkansas Governor Mike
Huckabee kicked off his 2016 presidential bid by asking his constituents
for $1 million donations, a clear violation of the $2,700 contribution limit
imposed on presidential primary election candidates.155 Election abuses
have become so prevalent that the FEC chairman admits, “[t]he likelihood
of the laws being enforced is slim . . . .People think the FEC is
150
See generally Matt Zapotosky & Matea Gold, Republican operative sentenced to 2
years in landmark election case, WASH. POST (June 12, 2015), https://www.washington
post.com/local/crime/feds-want-nearly-4-year-sentence-for-republican-operative-convicte
d-of-illegal-coordination/2015/06/11/7ecbdc72-0ed0-11e5-9726-49d6fa26a8c6_story.
html.
151
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Members Over $150,000, PROGRESSIVE TODAY (Aug. 17, 2015) http://www.progressives
today.com/bernie-sanders-used-campaign-donations-pay-family-members-2000-2004/.
152
See 52 U.S.C. § 30114(a) (2016).
153
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154
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See Philip Bump, Mike Huckabee kicks off his 2016 bid with a violation of campaign
finance law, WASH. POST (May 5, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/
wp/2015/05/05/mike-huckabee-kicks-off-his-2016-bid-with-a-violation-of-campaign-fina
nce-law/.
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dysfunctional. It’s worse than dysfunctional.”156 This begs the question:
given the emphasis placed on preserving the integrity of the democratic
process, why has our government demonstrated such incompetency with
respect to enforcing the campaign contribution laws? Viewed more
narrowly, why has the government failed to detect campaign offenses that
resemble bribery and extortion?
There are ultimately two reasons as to why legal authorities have only
sparingly detected campaign offenses resembling bribery and extortion.157
First off, legal action against bribery and extortion results in a conflict of
interest and prolonged political deadlock, as “agents of one group of
politicians (the executive branch) . . . prosecute another group (the
legislative branch), in a prosecution to be adjudicated by a third group (the
judiciary) typically appointed by the first (the executive).”158 Perhaps more
profoundly, however, the FEC is also frequently paralyzed by deadlock
due to the Republican-Democrat partisan split among the FEC’s six
commissioners.159 Consequently, the FEC is disinclined to pursue an
enforcement action, and instead allows the exposed politician to retire
without facing any consequences.160
The second—and perhaps more significant—reason for the
government’s inaction is “the similarity between illegal bribery/extortion
payments and ordinary, quite legal political contributions.”161 This reason
is what ultimately makes rent creation and rent extraction so easy to
practice without fear of being held accountable.162 Under the Hobbs Act,
in order to prosecute a candidate for accepting large contributions, there
must be an “explicit quid pro quo” agreement with the contributors.163 In
McCormick v. U.S., the Court held that federal prosecutors could convict
public officials under the Hobbs Act “for acting ‘under color of official
right’ in accepting payments that are made in return for an ‘explicit
promise or undertaking by the official to perform or not to perform an
official act.’”164 Even in full compliance with the standard set forth in
McCormick, however, public officials could still seek bribes without
violating the Hobbs Act so long as there is no explicit quid pro quo
156
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arrangement.165 Indeed, courts have held that “wink and nod” relationships
between candidates and donors do not constitute a violation of the public
corruption statutes.166 Given both the lack of any incriminating paper trail
left behind as well as the lack of any remedies available to address implicit
quid pro quo agreements, simple “wink and nod” relationships enable
candidates to easily evade civil and criminal liability.167
In the absence of an explicit agreement or promise, campaign
contributions ultimately function as “implicit bribes.”168 Under
McCormick, however, federal prosecutors cannot bring charges against
candidates for implicit bribery involving campaign contributions—despite
the subtle practical distinction between implicit and explicit agreements.169
Meanwhile, with respect to explicit agreements, the courts have been split
on what exactly constitutes an “explicit” quid pro quo arrangement;
therefore, the courts have struggled with interpreting “explicit” quid pro
quo violations of the Hobbs Act in the context of campaign
contributions.170 The unsettled nature of the law in this area has
consequently created a disincentive for the FEC to pursue enforcement
actions against candidates.171

V. POST-SCALIA: WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?
From the false dichotomy between contributions and expenditures, to
the loophole-ridden coordination and disclosure laws governing Super
PACs, to the “non-candidate” status exploited by Jeb Bush’s campaign, to
the FEC’s paralysis, to the lack of remedies available to deter implicit quid
pro quo agreements, the campaign finance system is in need of overhaul,
especially in the context of campaign contributions. All of these
deficiencies effectually allow candidates to bypass the contribution limits
with ease. In light of the circumvention of contribution limits and the
infusion of big money into the political process, public cynicism toward
the integrity of the democratic process continues to grow.172 The public
165
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cynicism is driven by the appearance of corruption, largely in part because
the American media has perpetuated images of candidates as selfinterested wrongdoers who can be bought.173
Given the practical flaws in the campaign finance system as well as
the public’s growing distrust, why have previous reform efforts been so
ineffective? In short, the First Amendment poses a major impediment to
any reform efforts. Because contributions are treated as a form of speech,
the Court will only amend the contribution laws if a sufficiently
compelling governmental interest is implicated.174 Thus far, only one
reason has been found sufficiently important to justify amending the
limits: preventing quid pro quo corruption, or its appearance.175 While the
concept of quid pro quo corruption seems fairly straightforward, the Court
has never been precise about the meaning of the appearance of
corruption.176 Nevertheless, given the Court’s narrow definition of
“corruption,” Congress may only target a specific type of corruption—
quid pro quo corruption.177 “[B]ecause the Government’s interest in
preventing the appearance of corruption is equally confined to the
appearance of quid pro quo corruption, the Government may not seek to
limit the appearance of mere influence or access.”178 The implications of
the Court’s narrow definition of “corruption” seem quite apparent: the
First Amendment protects anything short of outright bribery, including
influence and access. Moreover, in light of the fact that the Court has found
only one compelling reason to justify amending the contribution limits, the
question becomes: where do campaign finance reform efforts go from
here?
First and foremost, the implications of Justice Scalia’s death should be
contemplated through the lens of campaign finance reform. In Citizens
United, the Court’s conservative majority asserted itself, striking down the
limits placed on independent expenditures in a 5-4 vote.179 More
profoundly, the majority’s strong pro-First Amendment stance reflected in
the decision seems to have sparked negative unintended consequences,
including the spawn of Super PACs. What was the underlying reason for
the Court striking down the provision of the BCRA that limited
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independent expenditures? In a nutshell, the BCRA provision was not
invalidated on the basis of precedent, but rather was invalidated because it
was inconsistent with the Court’s political and ideological proclivities.
The Court in Citizens United overturned precedent set forth in Austin v.
Michigan Chamber of Commerce, which allowed restrictions on corporate
campaign spending.180 In light of the conservative majority’s lack of
commitment to the doctrine of stare decisis, the five conservative Supreme
Court justices have garnered criticism for acting disingenuously in their
handling of the case.181
In addition to being a staunch conservative and an unrelenting
defender of free speech, Justice Scalia was also the longest-serving justice
on the Supreme Court and its leading conservative voice. In the wake of
his death, it is now possible that the pendulum will begin to swing away
from the Court’s absolutist view of the First Amendment in the context of
campaign finance. If Scalia is eventually replaced with a liberal justice, it
seemingly becomes more likely that the Court will strike more of a balance
between the competing constitutional interests at stake—free speech vs.
the compelling governmental interest in curbing corruption. Perhaps a 5-4
liberal majority would view corporate money as a threat to the integrity of
the electoral process.
In any event, if a liberal justice were appointed as the replacement for
Justice Scalia, it seems likely that the Court would revisit and perhaps
overrule Citizens United, provided that a case challenging the decision is
brought before the Court.182 As recently set forth in Johnson v. U.S., “[t]he
doctrine of stare decisis allows [the Court] to revisit an earlier decision
where experience with its application reveals that it is unworkable.”183
Indeed, “even decisions rendered after full adversarial presentation may
have to yield to the lessons of subsequent experience.”184 Although the
Court made a good faith effort to prevent coordination and promote
transparency in its Citizens United ruling, the practical effect seems to be
increased coordination and exponential growth in dark money—a major
paradigm shift. Because of Citizens United, donors ostensibly use Super
PACs as a vehicle to circumvent the contribution limits placed on
180

See Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Comm., 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
See Geoffrey R. Stone, Citizens United and Conservative Judicial Activism, 2012 U.
ILL. L. REV. 485, 488 (2012).
182
In 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court had the opportunity to overturn Citizens United.
After granting certiorari, the U.S. Supreme Court issued a brief, unsigned order reversing
a Montana Supreme Court decision, which had upheld a state law that prohibited corporate
spending in state elections. The U.S. Supreme Court ultimately adhered to principles of
stare decisis and doubled down on Citizens United. See American Tradition Partnership,
Inc., et al. v. Bullock, 567 U.S. __ (2012).
183
Johnson v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 2551, 2562 (2015).
184
Id.
181

2016-2017]

TURNING CASH INTO VOTES

137

candidates. Given the decision’s seemingly perverse consequences and
practical unworkability, the Court may become more inclined to revisit
Citizens United.
Assuming the Court does revisit Citizens United, there are two
alternative approaches the Court can take, upon review, to combat the
influence of dark money on elections. To preface, unless the Court changes
its position and holds that the government has no anti-corruption interest
in limiting campaign contributions, or alternatively the government has an
anti-corruption interest in limiting independent expenditures, the First
Amendment, as currently interpreted, remains an impediment to the
implementation of either approach. Correspondingly, a potential criticism
of the two proposed solutions is that they arguably presuppose that
influence is tantamount to corruption; such criticism assumes that
disproportionate political influence is not necessarily a bad thing.185
Despite potential criticism, the aim of both approaches is to achieve a level
playing field between candidates and Super PACs.186 In an effort to
achieve this objective, the proposed approaches seek to strike more of a
balance between the two competing constitutional interests at stake: an
individual’s right to engage in political speech as opposed to the public’s
interest in “collective speech,” which involves the government’s anticorruption interest.187 To strike such a balance, the Court would seemingly
have to change its position on whether the First Amendment allows a
broader definition of “corruption.”188 Although the Court currently
acknowledges “quid pro quo corruption” as the only true form of
“corruption,” it seems that the solicitation of large contributions in
exchange for political favors, or to avoid political disfavors, poses the
same danger of drowning out the voices of the many.189 Indeed,
broadening the definition of “corruption” to include influence and access
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is not unprecedented, as demonstrated by the Court’s decision in
McConnell.190
Turning to the first approach, the Court can choose to limit
contributions made to Super PACs in the same manner it limits direct
contributions made to candidates—a return to the pre-Citizens United
campaign finance regime. This approach recognizes that large
independent expenditures may indeed give rise to the appearance of
corruption.191 Such a judicial interpretation assumes that contributions
made to Super PACs would be subject to the intermediate scrutiny
standard.192 In the interest of protecting “collective speech,”193 this
approach restricts corporate campaign spending in an effort to combat the
distorting effect of independent expenditures on the political process.
From a practical standpoint, bids for political favors, or to avoid political
disfavors, would be constrained, and thus, there would seemingly be less
money flowing through the electoral process. While “[f]avoritism and
influence are not . . . avoidable in representative politics,”194 candidates
may be less inclined to coordinate with Super PACs given the diminished
financial incentive. In essence, this approach is another form of
governmental price-fixing.
Alternatively, the second approach the Court can take is to strike down
the caps placed on direct contributions to candidates, ultimately abolishing
contribution limits altogether. Applying the same reasoning used by the
Court in Citizens United with respect to independent expenditures,
limiting the amount an individual may give to a candidate imposes a direct
restraint on his or her political speech—a view that is in accord with
Justice Thomas’ concurring opinion in McCutcheon.195 This judicial
interpretation assumes that contribution limits would be subject to the
same strict scrutiny as other forms of speech.196 At first such a proposal
190
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may seem facetious, as it amounts to “fighting fire with fire.”197 From a
practical standpoint, however, the current contribution limits are simply
unrealistic given the steep cost of running a competitive campaign.
Moreover, lifting the contribution limits may create greater transparency
and accountability because less money would be siphoned away from
candidates and into dark money groups, likely resulting in a more
informed electorate. Because less money would be siphoned away from
candidates and into special interest groups, corporations would seemingly
become less likely to wield disproportionate influence over candidates.
Although the lifting of contribution caps may infuse more money into the
electoral process, donations would theoretically be distributed more
proportionally between candidates and special interest groups. Given that
the electoral process is already flooded with money, though, would large
direct contributions really appear to have a corrupting effect?198 At the
very least, dismantling the contribution limits placed on candidates would
theoretically give those who contribute directly to candidates the same
freedom as those who spend money independently, creating a system that
seems no worse than the current one.
On balance, the two proposed approaches—despite disparate
methodologies—theoretically could generate the same outcome: a level
playing field between candidates and Super PACs. However, on the flip
side, the Court may face the same quandary it faced in Citizens Untied
with respect to its commitment to the doctrine of stare decisis. After all,
both of the proposed solutions—placing contribution caps on Super PACs,
or alternatively repealing the contribution caps placed on direct
contributions to candidates—would require the Court to overturn its own
precedent set in Citizens United. As such, to avoid another outright
rejection of the doctrine of stare decisis, perhaps the Court should instead
take a more pragmatic approach and defer to Congress’ lawmaking power.

VI. CONCLUSION
As it currently stands, both Congress and the Court seem inclined to
defer to the FEC with respect to dealing with election abuses. Without
reform, however, candidates face no credible threat of prosecution for
election abuses, and thus, it seems that their behavior will continue to
197
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resemble the corrupt practices of bribery and extortion. In an effort to
obtain positive economic profits, donors will likely comply with the
candidates’ demands—either to gain political favors or to avoid political
disfavors, as demonstrated by the application of the rent creation and rent
extraction economic models. Correspondingly, in an effort to raise enough
money to run competitive campaigns, candidates will continue to become
increasingly reliant on, and entwined with Super PACs—an arrangement
that seemingly enables the parties to legally circumvent campaign
contribution caps, essentially rendering the contribution limits
meaningless. The residual effect of the Super PACs’ influence on elections
appears to be the further erosion of the public’s trust and confidence in the
political process. In light of the negative practical consequences of the
Citizens United decision, it seems prudent for the Court to defer to
Congress on the issue of how to regulate campaign contributions.

